The article "Communication Failures Contributing to the Challenger Accident: An Example for Technical Communicators" by D. A. Winsor highlights a series of failed communication attempts between engineers and managers within NASA, Marshall Space Center and Morton Thiokol International (MTI). Winsor suggests two important factors contributed to poor communication, and ultimately one of the worst disasters in space exploration history. In the article, Winsor suggests managers and engineers viewed the same facts from different perspectives. She points out that "communication, then, is not just shared information; it is shared interpretation" (101). Specifically, the interpretation depended upon one's vantage point, role, concerns and values. In addition, Winsor notes "there is a general difficulty of sending or receiving bad news, particularly when it must be passed to superiors or outsiders" (101). She suggests these two communication issues contributed to the Challenger accident.
A difference in interpretation between engineers and managers was highlighted in MTI engineer Roger Boisjoly's memo to MTI's Vice President of Engineering, R. K. Lund on July 22. The memo was full of "emotional language," which is uncharacteristic of most engineering memos, and contained an urgent plea to take immediate action. Boisjoly made reference to the fact that human lives could potentially be lost, as well as a flight along with all the launch pad facilities. Boisjoly's concern was kept within MTI as he marked his memo with the words "COMPANY PRIVATE".
Why was it difficult for managers to listen to engineers who had actually been conducting the tests, performing the experiments and seeing the results first-hand? The managers knew the launch could potentially be catastrophic, why did they feel such pressure to follow through with a life-threatening space shuttle launch? Most importantly, how can two sets of people look at the same facts and one believe that lives could be at stake, and the other believe lives were not at stake? Bad news was not relayed to Marshall unless they asked MTI questions. Responses were sent containing little to no "emotional language" and no sense of urgency. Instead, questions were answered with responses that were not untruthful, but not very communicative. The responses provided facts with very little interpretation. MTI engineers specifically, "varied the extent to which they voiced seriousness, depending on whether their audience was internal or external" (105).
In a January 1986 teleconference involving numerous MTI and Marshall managers and engineers, MTI recommended delaying the space shuttle launch. Marshall refused to accept the bad news and resisted the recommendation. They challenged the conclusions drawn from MTI's facts. During a private caucus off the phone line, MTI vice presidents voted unanimously to appease Marshall and continue with the launch as scheduled. Although there were engineers in the room, not one of them was asked to vote. Once the vice presidents had voted in favor of the launch, they went back on the conference line and reversed their earlier warning. The Challenger launched at 11:38 the following morning.
A question that comes to mind after reading this article is how were NASA officials involved in the communication of the preliminary testing results? Winsor notes that "Hardy and Mulloy did not pass on to NASA officials the fact that MTI engineers were opposed to the launch" (106). The article discusses the communication that took place between MTI and Marshall; however, NASA officials were rarely mentioned. What role did NASA play in the communication prior to January 28, 1986?Finally, what lessons were learned from this tragedy? Specifically, how has technical communication changed at MTI, Marshall and NASA?
